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Abstract
In the linear coinsurance problem, examined rst by Mossin (1968),
a higher risk aversion with respect to wealth in the sense of Arrow-
Pratt implies a higher optimal coinsurance rate. We show that this
property does not hold for health insurance under ex post moral haz-
ard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and
policyholders decide on their health expenditures. The optimal coin-
surance rate trades o¤ a risk sharing e¤ect and an incentive e¤ect,
both related to risk aversion. JEL Codes: D1, D8, I1. Keywords:
Health insurance; ex post moral hazard; coinsurance.
Ecole Polytechnique, Department of Economics, 91128, Palaiseau Cedex, France.
Email: pierre.picard@polytechnique.edu
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1 Introduction
The linear coinsurance problem, originally examined by Mossin (1968), plays
an important role in the analysis of economic and nancial decisions under
risk, and this is for at least two reasons. Firstly, this model is suitable for
tractable comparative statics analysis, in order to study wealth and income
e¤ects on insurance demand in various settings (e.g., with or without back-
ground risk, in a static or dynamic setting, etc...). Secondly, its conclusions
can be straighforwardly adapted to the analysis of static portfolio choices
when agents can invest in one risk-free asset and in one risky asset. An
important property of this model states that the individuals degree of risk
aversion with respect to wealth in the sense of Arrow-Pratt goes hand in
hand with a higher optimal coinsurance rate: more risk averse individuals
choose a higher coinsurance rate.
In this note, we will show that this property does not hold for health insur-
ance under ex post moral hazard. There is ex post moral hazard in medical
insurance when insurers do not observe the severity of illness and policy-
holders may exaggerate their health care expenses - Arrow (1963), Pauly
(1968) and Zeckhauser (1970). Linear coinsurance under ex post moral haz-
ard (i.e., when insurers pay the same fraction of the health care cost whatever
the individualsexpenses) has been considered by many authors, including
Zeckhauser (1970), Feldstein (1973), Arrow (1976), and Feldman and Dowd
(1991) to analyze the trade-o¤ between two conicting objectives: providing
risk coverage on one side, and incentivizing policyholders to moderate their
health expenses on the other side.
In order to show that ex post moral hazard breaks the link between the
degree of risk aversion and the optimal coinsurance rate, we will proceed
through a simple example. We will consider a model where utility depends
on wealth and health in an additive way, with constant absolute risk aversion
with respect to wealth, and where the utility derived from health is linear.
Furthermore, the only private information of individuals is about the severity
of their illness. All other preference parameters, including health risk expo-
sure and risk aversion are either observed by insurers, or rather recovered
from observable variables such as age, education, occupation, marital status
or from past loss experience. These very crude assumptions are obviously
not chosen for the sake of realism, but because they allow us to focus on the
ex post moral hazard problem in a fully computable model, without inter-
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fering with adverse or advantageous selection issues. It will turn out that,
in this model, the optimal coinsurance rate does not depend on the index of
absolute risk aversion.
The intuition for this result goes through two e¤ects of an increase in the
coinsurance rate. On one hand, for a given pattern of health care expenses, a
larger coinsurance rate o¤ers a better risk protection to risk averse individu-
als: thus, the larger the degree of risk aversion, the larger the benet drawn
for this more complete risk coverage. This is the standard channel that links
together the intensity of risk aversion and the optimal insurance coverage.
On the other hand, an increase in coverage exacerbates health care overex-
penses, and it turns out that, in an expected utility setting such as ours, this
(dis)incentive e¤ect is the larger as the absolute risk aversion is small. Thus,
more risk aversion entails less nancial risk, because it corresponds to less
health care overexpenses, and thus it reduces the need for insurance cover-
age. When the index of absolute risk aversion increases, the risk protection
e¤ect and the incentive e¤ect push the optimal coinsurance rate upwards
and downwards, respectively. In the model that we will consider, these two
e¤ects exactly balance each other out, so that the optimal coinsurance rate
remains unchanged.
2 A computable example
Let us consider an individual whose welfare depends both on monetary wealth
R and health level H, with a separable bi-variate von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function U(R;H) = u(R) + v(H). The individual displays CARA
preferences with respect to wealth, i.e., u(R) =   expf Rg, where  is the
index of absolute risk aversion, and v(H) = H;  > 0. We thus have
U(R;H) =   expf Rg+ H:
Health may be negatively a¤ected by illness, but it increases with the health
care expenses. This is written as
H = h0   x(1 m);  > 0;
where h0 is the initial health endowment, x is the severity of illness and m
is the health care expense level. Illness severity is distributed as a random
variable X over an intervall [a; b];with a > 0, and the parameters of the
3
problem are such that m 2 [0; 1]. Thus, the health level H increases linearly
from h0   x to h0 when m increases from 0 to 1.
The individuals insurance contract species that a fraction  of the mone-
tary expenses are reimbursed and that the insurance premium P is actuarial.
It is assumed that insurers observe all the characteristics of insurance seekers,
including their risk exposure and degree of risk aversion (i.e., the probability
distribution of X and parameter ). In more concrete terms, insurers are
supposed to be able to recover these information through observable charac-
teristics, such as age, gender or level of education.1
In state x, the individuals wealth is
R(x) = w   (1  )m(x)  P;
where m(x) denotes the health care expenses in state x. The individual
chooses m(x) such that
m(x) 2 arg max [  expf (w   (1  )bm  P )g+ xbm]bm2[0;1] :
Let us assume that m(x) 2 (0; 1) for all x. Later, we will nd conditions
under which this is actually the case. Then, the rst-order condition form(x)
to be an optimal choice of the individual is written as
 (1  ) expf R(x)g+ x = 0;
which implies
R(x) =
1

ln

(1  )
x

; (1)
and
m(x) =
(w   P ) + ln
h
x
(1 )
i
(1  ) :
Using P = E[m(X)] yields
E[R(X)] = w   (1  )E[m(X)]  P = w   P

=
1

E

ln

(1  )
X

:
1Outreville (2014) surveys the empirical analysis of socio-demographic variables asso-
ciated with risk aversion.
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which gives
P = w +


E

ln

X
(1  )

; (2)
and using (1) and (2) yields
m(x) =
w   P  R(x)
1  
= w   1

ln[(1  )] + ln(x)  E[ln(X)]
(1  ) (3)
By disregarding the constant term h0 E[X], (1) and (3) allow us to write
the individuals expected utility as
 E [expf R(X)g] + E[Xm(X)]
=   E[X]
(1  )
+

E[X]w   E[X]

ln[(1  )] + E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]
(1  )

;
which is maximized with respect to  2 [0; 1]. Let z = 1=(1 ). Equivalently,
z maximizes
V (z)  E[X] ln(z) + z[  E[X]];
in [1;+1), where
 = E[X ln(X)]  E[X]E[ln(X)]
= cov[X; ln(X)] > 0:
We have
V 0(z) =   E[X] + E[X]
z
;
V 00(z) =  E[X]
z2
< 0:
and
V 0(1) =  > 0
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If
 < E[X]; (4)
then V (z) is maximized over [1;+1) when
z =
E[X]
E[X]  > 1;
that is
 =

E[X]
=
cov[X; ln(X)
E[X]
2 (0; 1): (5)
If   E[X], then  = 1 would be an optimal corner solution, with m(x) = 1
for all x. Thus (4) is a necessary condition for an optimal interior solution to
exist. (3) shows that m(x) is increasing for such an interior solution. Thus
we have m(x) 2 (0; 1) for all x 2 [a; b] if
w 2 (w;w); (6)
where w and w are given by (3), m(a) = 0;m(b) = 1 and  = =E[X], with
w > w if
ln(b=a) < (1  ). (7)
In short, under (4),(6) and (7), we have an interior optimal solution  =
=E[X] 2 (0; 1) with m(x) 2 (0; 1) for all x. At this optimal solution, the
coinsurance rate  is given by (5) and it is independent from the index of
absolute risk aversion . It only depends on the probability distribution of
the illness severity X.2
3 Comments
Let R(x) be the individuals wealth that would be chosen in state x in the
absence of insurance, that is
R(x) =
1

ln


x

;
2Everything else given, (7) does not hold when  is small enough. In that case, m(x)
is equal to 0 or 1 in a sub-interval of [a; b]. Thus, strictly speaking, the independence of
 from  has been established among values of  that are large enough for such corner
solutions no to be optimal.
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with R(x) < R(x) when  > 0. R(x) is ex post e¢ cient, since the marginal
utility of wealth is the same, be it used for health care or for other uses. A de-
crease in R(x)=R(x) corresponds to an increase in health care overexpenses
(i.e., an increase above the ex post e¢ cient level).3 Assume R(x) > 0, and
thus ln(=x) > 0. We have
@[R(x)=R(x)]
@
=   1
(1  ) ln(=x) < 0;
@2[R(x)=R(x)]
@@
=
1
(1  ) ln(=x)2 > 0:
Thus, as expected, an increase in  increases the health care overexpense (i.e.,
R(x)=R(x) decreases), but the larger the index of risk aversion, the smaller
this induced expense e¤ect. In other words, more risk aversion corresponds
to less nancial risk, because it corresponds to less health care overexpenses.
Coming back to our initial notation, the index of risk aversion is equal to
 d[ln(u0(R)]=dR, and thus it measures the rate of increase in the marginal
utility of wealth when wealth decreases, and thus it is not astonishing that
the larger the absolute risk aversion, the smaller the insurance-induced in-
crease in health care spending. This induced risk exposure is anticipated by
insurance seekers, and thus it is a reason why more risk averse individuals
may purchase less insurance. Conversely, for a given risk exposure, more
risk averse individuals tend to purchase more insurance. In the absence of
loading, they would purchase full coverage if there were no ex post moral
hazard. In the present model, the two mechanisms compensate exactly, and
ultimately risk aversion does not a¤ect the optimal coinsurance rate.
4 Conclusion
Risk aversion may depend on several parameters, including wealth, age, mar-
ital status and occupation, among others. Consider the case of a background
risk, such as business interruption, assumed to be uninsurable and in force
for self-employed people, but not for employees. Under risk vulnerability,
such a background risk makes the individual more averse to other indepen-
dent risks, including health care expenditures. If insurance expenses were
3Note that R(x)=R(x) is decreasing with respect to x. Thus, the larger the severity
of illness, the larger the distortion in health expenses due to ex post moral hazard.
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perfectly monitored by the insurer, then this background risk would increase
the coinsurance rate for health care. In other words, everything else given,
self-employed people should choose a more complete health insurance than
employees. The previous example shows that this is no more the case under
ex post moral hazard.
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